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the defendant did not reside at the address at the time that the
plaintiff's process server swore he made substituted service. The
court also refused plaintiff's application for a nunc pro tunc order
pursuant to CPLR 308(4), stating that even though the plaintiff
had no knowledge of the process server's perjury, this did not
excuse the wholly unauthorized act of "nailing and mailing" the
summons and complaint to a place where the defendant did not in
fact reside. The court went on to stress its strong disapproval of
this practice:
[Pirocess servers should be discouraged from sewer service, and
attorneys from employing process servers who cannot be trusted to
perform the acts they swear they do by refusing to accord any significance
to acts performed by them without the factual basis which the law
requires.1 1
The practitioner would be wise to heed the court's warning in
view of the fact that should service be subsequently vacated, the
statute of limitations may have expired.
CPLR 308(3): Substituted service vacated.
In Todd v. Todd,12 substituted service under CPLR 308(3)
was vacated where it was conclusively shown that defendant did
not reside at the address where the process server swore service had
been made.
The court, however, noted that the plaintiff might be able to
seek authorization to examine defendant's present attorney concerning defendant's address. Then, if the defendant's address could
not be obtained in this fashion, the court indicated that plaintiff
would have a basis for a 308(4) order authorizing service on
the attorney, "for there dearly is contact between defendant and
his attorney and service on the attorney will conform to the requirements of due process."' 3
4
This would seem to be in accord with Winterstein v. Pollard,"
wherein the court did not allow substituted service under 308(4)
on the defendant's insurer since there was no showing of an
actual contact between the defendant and the insurer. The court
in Winterstein stated that "it cannot be said that notice to the
insurer is reasonably calculated to give notice to the defendant." 15
In the present case, there would seem to be three possibilities
of service: (1) if the plaintiff fails to secure an examination of

"Id. at 95, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 456. (Emphasis added.)

Misc. 2d 94, 272 N.Y.S2d 455 (Sup. Ct Nassau County 1966).
Is Id.at 96, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
1450 Misc. 2d 354, 270 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct Nassau County 1966).
Is Id. at 355, 270 N.Y.S,2d at 527.
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the attorney, he could then move under CPLR 308(4) for an
order directing service on the attorney as agent for the defendant,
since the court has said that there is "contact" between the attorney
and the defendant; (2) if the plaintiff secures an examination of
the attorney, however, and obtains the defendant's address, then
he would have to attempt service under 308(1) and (3) before
he could move for an order under 308(4); (3) if service under
308(1) and (3) were to be impracticable, however, he could then
move to serve the attorney as defendant's agent under 308(4).
CPLR 308(4):

Conflict over requirements of due process.

Although substituted service need not give actual notice to
the defendant, it must be reasonably calculated to apprise him of
the pendency of the action and afford him the opportunity to be
heard. 6 There appears to be a conflict between the first and second
departments concerning substituted service under CPLR 308 and
the constitutional requirements of due process.
The second department, in Dobkin v. Chapman,7 affirmed a
court-devised method of service under CPLR 308(4).
There,
the court held that due process was satisfied by service which
amounted to the mailing of the summons to an address supplied
by the defendant at the time of an automobile accident, even though
the plaintiff knew that the defendant no longer resided there.
The approach taken by the first department, however, was more
restrictive. In Polansky v. Paugh,8 the court unanimously held
that where a plaintiff knew that the defendant did not reside at
the stated address, due process was not satisfied since there was
no reasonable probability that the defendant would receive notice
of the pending action. Although Polansky was decided under
CPLR 308(3), and Dobkin under 308(4), it should be noted
that the same due process considerations apply to each.
Brown v. Green Bus Lines, Inc.,19 a recent supreme court case
in the second department, involved the validity of substituted service

under CPLR 308(3). There, an automobile accident occurred
in New York between plaintiff, a New York resident, and a nondomiciliary defendant. Defendant gave plaintiff a Florida address
at which the plaintiff attempted service under Section 253 of
the Vehicle and Traffic Law. However, this attempt failed since
the registered letter sent to the defendant in Florida was returned
marked "moved-left no address."
Thereafter, plaintiff had a
Florida sheriff attempt personal service on the defendant at the
Florida address. When this also failed, the sheriff mailed a
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
25 App. Div. 2d 745, 269 N.Y.S.2d
18 23 App. Div. 2d 643, 256 N.Y.S.2d
19 51 Misc. 2d 412, 273 N.Y.S.2d 346
16
17

Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
49 (2d Dep't 1966).
961 (1st Dep't 1965).
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1966).

